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INDECENT EXPOSURE: GENES ARE MORE THAN A 
BRAND NAME LABEL IN THE DNA DATABASE DEBATE 
By: Jessica D. Gabel* 
"[T]his is perhaps the most important criminal procedure case that 
this court has heard in decades ... [l]ots of murders, lots of rapes that 
can be solved using this new technology that involves a very minimal 
intrusion on personal privacy."l Few can argue with the message that 
DNA saves lives,2 and that message is used time and again to justify 
the continued bloat of DNA databases. Saving lives and solving 
cases are the intended outcomes of the creation of DNA databases, 
but even with such laudable goals there are unintended-yet 
predictable-consequences.3 In 1986, Donald Reynolds and Billy 
Wardell were convicted of raping a student in Illinois.4 They spent 
eleven years in prison before being exonerated based on newly 
analyzed DNA evidence recovered from the crime scene. 5 Although 
they were released from prison and cleared of any wrongdoing, both 
Reynolds and Wardell may be labeled sex offenders for the rest of 
their lives.6 Prior to the new code section addressing expungement, 
effective January 1, 2013, Illinois law required that all DNA profiles 
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Id. "[AJ DNA artifact recovered from the crime scene was analyzed in a Maryland 
lab, and it proved that the semen was neither Reynold's nor Wardell's." Jd. 
Id. 
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and may not be subject to expungement.,,7 The new expungement 
provision does not claim to be retroactive, so it is unlikely that it 
would be helpful for Reynolds and Wardell. Thus, it appears that 
"their [DNA] profiles do not necessarily have to be purged from the 
system."g 
Despite the previous policies of Illinois and other states that do not 
explicitly require expungement at all, many states require both the 
expungement of the profile and the destruction of the corresponding 
DNA sample collected from wrongfully convicted offenders.9 The 
Maryland DNA collection statute, for example, requires both the 
DNA sample and profile to be expunged once the defendant's 
conviction has been overturned; however, the statute requires that 
identifying information be expunged from "every data base into 
which it has been entered, including local, State, and federal data 
bases."iO Poor drafting of these laws, however, may lead to problems 
down the road. For example, the expungement provisions of some 
state statutes require that samples be expunged from the state DNA 
databanks. II Because many state databanks link to the federal 
database, this wording leaves open a loophole that could allow the 
DNA profile to remain in either the national or the local system. 12 
Further, the laws of Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, and Wyoming 
require only expungement of the DNA record from the database; they 
do not require the destruction of the DNA samples themselves. 13 
Of course, the tempting rationalization to make is that these 
glitches in the system are acceptable for the greater good. This is not 
to say that DNA databases are not useful. Indeed, DNA database hits 
have been instrumental in linking criminals to prior unsolved crimes 
7. ld. (citing 730 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3(t) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999». The new 
code section allows for expungement, but only where "that pardon document 
specifically states that the reason for the pardon is the actual innocence of an 
individual." 730 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. S/5-4-3(f-l) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012). 
8. Hibbert, supra note 4. 
9. ld.; see also, e.g., infra note 10. 
10. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-Sll(c) (LexisNexis 2011). 
11. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4713(i); HAW. REv. STAT. § 844D-71(a); LA. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 15:614; NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-4109; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-SA-29. 
Although Maryland considered adopting this "statewide" language, the current code 
section requires expungement of the DNA record from all databases-including local 
and federal databases-that contain the record once a conviction is reversed on 
grounds of actual innocence. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-SII(c) (LexisNexis 
2011). 
12. Hibbert, supra note 4. 
13. ME. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 1577(4) (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22E, § IS (West 
2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-107 (2011); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-40S (2011); 
Hibbert, supra note 4. 
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and bringing closure to many victims and families. For example, 
New York police uncovered a serial rapist in July 2012, after a DNA 
sample in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Combined DNA 
Index System (CODIS) matched evidence from a twenty-five-year-
old rape case. 14 William Joseph Trice was convicted in 2010 
for raping an Annapolis, Maryland woman in 1988. 15 After police 
received information indicating that DNA profiles from two of their 
cold cases matched a profile in CODIS, they reviewed evidence from 
the 1988 Annapolis rape case. 16 A fingerprint recovered from the 
scene was matched to Trice, whose prints were in the latent 
fingerprint database. 17 Trice was tried and convicted of the 
Annapolis rape in January 2010, and was also linked to the December 
1988 rape of a 42-year-old woman. 18 Further, as recently as July 
2012, Trice was linked to the 1987 rape of yet another woman, and 
State's Attorney Frank Weathersbee is "encouraging jurisdictions in 
the surrounding area with unsolved rapes from the mid to late 1980s 
to review the evidence and determine whether a DNA profile can be 
run for a CODIS match.,,19 
One would be hard pressed to argue with such success. However, 
is being wrongly labeled a sex offender for life and having one's 
DNA forever on file, susceptible to database trawls, an acceptable 
consequence of solving crimes and closing cases? The criminal 
justice system has, by and large, answered this question 
affirmative1y.20 It is part of the "game of consequences,,21 upon 
which the system feasts. While that question deserves more 
discussion, it is only one of many issues-too many to address in this 
article-that are omnipresent in the DNA database discussion. 






18. ld. "Trice committed suicide by hanging himself in his jail cell six days after his 
conviction." Jd. 
19. ld. 
20. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West Supp. 2013); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 
17.175(1) (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAfETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2011); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-610 (2007). 
21. ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, Old Mortality, in MEMORIES AND PORTRAITS ch. 3 (1912), 
available at http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.auls/stevensonirobert_louis/s848mp/index.html 
(last updated Nov. 12,2012,7:25 PM). 
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I. DNA DATABASES: THE EMPEROR'S NEW KLUGES 22 
In the family tree of criminal investigations, DNA is no longer the 
awkward, misunderstood cousin to fingerprints. Rather, DNA has 
moved to the forefront of identification, and is often associated with 
the term "gold standard. ,,23 Still in its infancy stage in the 1990s, the 
use of DNA in criminal cases has exploded over the past twenty 
years. 24 No longer reserved for sexual assault and homicide cases, 
DNA has found a foothold in even lowly property crime 
investigations.25 Because of its power for precision and accuracy in 
the identification of suspects, DNA quickly became the focal point of 
a broad-scale offender database, capable of linking suspects to the 
previously unsolved crimes they comrnitted.26 
To be sure, it would be hard to either discount or deny the obvious 
benefits that have accrued with the proliferation of DNA databases. 
CODIS went live in 1998, and is now the epicenter of many criminal 
investigations on the local, state, and national levels.27 The advent of 
DNA databases is not a surprising one. With the expansion of DNA 
22. A kluge is computer slang for "a software or hardware configuration that, while 
inelegant, inefficient, clumsy, or patched together, succeeds in solving a specific 
problem or performing a particular task." Kluge, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.comibrowselkluge?s=t (last visited Jan. 22,2013). 
23. E.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law 
Enforcement Control ofScientijic Research, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 53,58 (2011). 
24. See Karen J. Maschke, DNA and Law Enforcement, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND 
BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR 
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS, 45, 45-46 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008), 
available at http://www.thehastingscenter.orgipublicationslbriefingbooklDefauIt.aspx. 
25. See, e.g., Joseph Blozis, Using DNA to Fight Property Crime, EVIDENCE TECH MAG., 
http://www.evidencemagazine.comlindex. php?option=com _ content&task=view&id= 1 
031 (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). In an effort to address staffing problems that have 
created a huge evidence backlog, the City of Oakland Police department has 
significantly decreased the number of fingerprints it takes from crime scenes and has 
begun to rely much more heavily on DNA profiles to solve crimes, though their DNA 
backlog is also significant. See Jesse Douglas Allen-Taylor, City Seeks Solutions to 
Crime Investigations Backlog, POST NEWSPAPER GROUP (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.postnewsgroup.comlpublishedcontentl20 12/081 14/city-seeks-solutions-to-
crime-investigations-backlogl. 
26. Maschke, supra note 24, at 45. 
27. CaDIS is the acronym for the "Combined DNA Index System" and is the generic 
term used to describe the FBI's program of support for criminal justice DNA 
databases as well as the software used to run these databases. Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, FBI, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2013). The National DNA Index System (NDIS) is one part of 
CaDIS containing the DNA profiles contributed by federal, state, and local 
participating forensic laboratories. Id. 
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evidence in criminal cases, the writing was on the wall: the criminal 
justice system needed to warehouse and recall the DNA profiles of 
offenders and profiles from unsolved cases.28 
CODIS stockpiles DNA profile records entered by local, state, and 
federal law enforcement agencies. 29 Constructed upon a set of 
thirteen randomly selected genetic markers, "CODIS draws from two 
indices: DNA profiles of individuals (mostly convicted offenders) 
and the other containing unidentified DNA from crime scenes. ,,30 As 
it pertains to federal offenders, the DNA Act, and its later 
amendments, requires collection of DNA samples from those 
convicted of, among other things, any felony or crime of violence, 
certain sexual offenses, and conspiracy to commit those crimes. 31 In 
2005, the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 expanded the pool of 
"offenders" to include DNA samples from federal arrestees. 32 
Not to be left in the dust, all fifty states now have similar 
provisions that establish DNA databases and mandate collection of 
samples from offenders, but the list of suspects is anything but 
usual.33 While databases were initially intended to store the profiles 
of sex offenders and other violent criminals-and some states do 
restrict the offender index to those individuals-state DNA databases 
have swelled to include those convicted of misdemeanor crimes.34 
While the list of collectible offenses has multiplied, states also have 
begun to follow the federal practice of collecting samples from 
28. See Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale 
Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 13 (2010) (explaining that 
CODIS was created to centralize and coordinate the myriad national, state, and local 
DNA databases that had begun to emerge in an effort to "foster the exchange and 
comparison of forensic DNA evidence from violent crime investigations" and that the 
"DNA Identification Act ('DNA Act') authorized the FBI to create the National DNA 
Index System ('NDIS') in 1994"). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 14. 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1 )(b), (d) (2006). The majority of DNA profiles stored in the 
national database are those of convicted felons who have served time for crimes such 
as assault and battery, rape, murder, and robbery, CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FBI, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lablbiometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2013), but the DNA Act now provides for DNA coIlection from individuals on 
probation, parole, and supervised release for federal offenses. 42 U.S.C. § 
14135a(a)(2) (2006). 
32. DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, sec. 1004, § 14135a, 119 Stat. 
2960,3085 (2006) (amended 42 U.S.C. § 14135a). 
33. Sarah B. Berson, Debating DNA Collection, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. J., Nov. 2009, at 9, 
10, available at https:llwww.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllnijl228381.pdf. 
34. Id. 
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arrestees.35 Currently, twenty-eight states and the federal government 
actively collect DNA samples from arrestees and add them to the 
offender index.36 Should the charges be dismissed or the government 
otherwise fail to obtain a conviction, the DNA profile (and the 
sample from which it came) may be left in a legal vacuum.37 
The majority of the states that permit arrestee collection put the 
onus on the individual to affirmatively seek destruction of the sample 
and expungement of the profile. 38 But if that profile has already been 
uploaded into CODIS and added to the national database, then it will 
remain there indefinitely, regardless of what happens at the state 
level. 39 The profile may also remain in a local database if there is no 
provision for removal from all DNA repositories. In contrast to the 
prevailing trend of placing the burden on the arrestee to request 
expungement, Maryland is one of only a handful of states that 
affirmatively requires the state to destroy the sample and eliminate 
the profile from the state database.4o Maryland law includes the 
corresponding duty to eliminate the profile if it has found its way into 
the national database maintained by the FBI.41 With the passage of 
Maryland HB 292 and removal of the sunset provision, section 2-
511 (c) does now appear to require removal of the profile from local, 
state, and federal databases.42 
Still, with the ambitious and nearly-unfettered expansion of DNA 
databases, it is perhaps not surprising that it raises privacy concerns, 
and relatedly, Fourth Amendment concerns.43 This article, however, 
is not about the Fourth Amendment. Nor is it about privacy. This 
article focuses on an issue that, in my view, is all too often given 
short shrift in the DNA database debate: the collection of DNA is 
about more than just putting genetic material into a barcode format. 
35. ld. at 9-11. 
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT'L INST. OF 
JUST. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://nij .gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dnalcollection-from-
arrestees.htm. 
37. See Berson, supra note 33, at 11. 
38. ld. 
39. See id. (noting independent federal requirements for expungement); DNA Sample 
Collection from Arrestees, supra note 36. 
40. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(a) (LexisNexis 2011). 
41. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(c) (LexisNexis 2011). See Berson, supra note 
33, at 11 (noting that under the federal statute a person must affirmatively request 
expungement); Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest 
Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 767, 810 (1999). 
42. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(c) (LexisNexis 2011). 
43. E.g., Berson, supra note 33, at 11-13. 
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Courts, time and again, liken DNA profiles to fingerprints44 or license 
plates,45 but the information gleaned from a sample is so much more. 
As we continue the expansion of DNA collection in this country to 
include more offenders and arrestees, and quite possibly those outside 
of the criminal justice system, we should consider the broader 
implications of warehousing our genetic material. 
II. A FALLACY IN THE ANALOGY: DNA IS MORE THAN A 
FINGERPRINT 
Infallibility. DNA was perhaps preordained to receive this label. 
Unlike any other type of forensic analysis that preceded it, DNA 
finally approached the unrealized Holy Grail in prosecutions: 
certainty. 46 From its inception, the true believers have proclaimed 
DNA analysis to be the criminal justice equivalent of the second 
coming. The courts have grasped this rhetoric with the gusto of a 
cult-like following.47 The public perception of DNA is no different. 
After all, DNA has the power to free the innocent and to condemn the 
guilty. Popular culture hits such as CSI and Law & Order tell us that 
the smallest sample-a drop of sweat inside a baseball cap or saliva 
on chewing gum-will bring the wrongdoer to justice.48 
With that insatiable desire for certainty, our unwavering faith in 
DNA has made us blind to both the shortcomings of DNA evidence 
and the true nature of what DNA is.49 In effect, we have been 
desensitized to the use of our genetic material as a crime-fighting 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 409-10 (3d Cir. 2011) (colIecting 
cases), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012). 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 531 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Finding 
Beverly'S [DNA] at the crime scene is essentialIy equivalent to finding that the last 
two digits of a license plate of a car owned by defendant matched the last two 
numbers of a license plate of a getaway car. "). 
46. See William C. Thompson, The Potential for Error in Forensic DNA Testing, 
GENEWATCH, Nov.-DEC. 2008, 5, 5, available at 
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org! /pageDocuments/ AJWLK 7M I A V. pdf. 
47. See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410 (asserting "that a DNA profile is used solely as an 
accurate, unique, identitying marker-in other words, as fingerprints for the twenty-
first century"); State v. Raines, 381 Md. 1,25, 857 A.2d 19,25 (2004) (finding that 
"[t]he DNA profile thus serves the purpose of increasing the efficiency and accuracy 
in identifying individuals within a certain class of convicted criminals" and thus, 
"[t]he purpose is akin to that of a fingerprint"). 
48. See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About 
Forensic Science Affects the Public's Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47 
JURIMETRICS J. 357, 363 (2007) (reporting differences among regular viewers of 
television programs focusing on forensic science and non-viewers). 
49. See Thompson, supra note 46, at 5-6. 
568 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
tool. Notions of infallibility breed acquiescence, and it has fueled 
and facilitated the development of DNA databases.5o 
Given DNA's rock-star status, it is not surprising that its 
infallibility has become an almost unassailable assumption.51 While I 
have severe reservations over the perceived infallibility of the DNA 
"truth machine," I want to suspend that particular argument for the 
purposes of this article and instead focus on the prevailing notion 
among courts that DNA is somehow analogous to fingerprints in 
terms of the information gathered and the "inconvenience" visited 
upon suspects. 52 This issue is generally housed in the ongoing (and 
perhaps evolving) notions of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
A. That Pesky Fourth Amendment 
I do not pretend to be a Fourth Amendment scholar. In fact, I 
perhaps embody some of the "Luddite approach" to Fourth 
Amendment interpretation that the Ninth Circuit scowled at in 
Haskell,53 and that the dissent trumpeted in King v. State. 54 
Nonetheless, to fully appreciate the DNA-fingerprint analogy, some 
consideration must be paid to the Fourth Amendment (just not the 
next forty pages). 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects 
individuals from those searches and seizures that are 
"unreasonable.,,55 Much of the debate surrounding the 
constitutionality of DNA databases focuses on the acquisition of the 
samples that comprise the database itself. 56 These samples are 
obtained and often analyzed by law enforcement officers, thus raising 
Fourth Amendment concerns. 57 Specifically, many of those opposed 
50. ld. at 5. 
51. See Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 48, at 357-58. The subjective nature of DNA 
analysis creates a risk for "false matches and wrongful convictions." Brief of 14 
Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 25, 
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (No. 12-207),2013 WL 476046. 
52. See, e.g., Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410-11 (concluding that a DNA profile is akin to a 
simple fingerprint, which is a minimally intrusive method of identification). 
53. Haskell v. Harris, 669 FJd 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012), reh'g en banc granted, 686 
FJd 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). 
54. King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 611-12, 42 A.3d 549, 586 (2012) (Barbera, J., 
dissenting), cert granted sub nom. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
55. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
56. See DNA and the Fourth Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.coml20 12/08/06/opinionJdna-and-the-fourth-
amendment.html? _ r=O. 
57. See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 406-13 (discussing the privacy interests implicated when 
DNA is extracted from an individual). 
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to the practice of obtaining samples from arrestees prior to conviction 
rely on the judicially created right of privacy, grounded in the 
language of the Fourth Amendment.58 It provides that "rtlhe right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.,,59 
Early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence required an actual physical 
invasion into one of the enumerated categories in the Amendment in 
order to find a search occurred.60 But the 1967 case of Katz v. United 
States changed that standard when the Court held that recording 
conversations that took place inside a phone booth constituted a 
search.61 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion laid out a two-prong 
test to determine whether a search has occurred for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.62 First, the court must ask whether the 
defendant subjectively had an actual expectation of privacy. 63 
Second, the court must ask whether "society is prepared to recognize 
[ that expectation] as 'reasonable.",64 
The second prong has been the most problematic, particularly in 
the face of ever-evolving technology.65 As technology advances and 
the line between public and private places blurs, societal recognition 
of an expectation of privacy as reasonable becomes more and more 
58. See, e.g., DNA and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 56 (explaining that proponents 
of the practice argue that it is minimally intrusive, while opponents argue it can only 
be performed with a warrant and is thus a violation of an arrestee's Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights). 
59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
60. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961) (finding a Fourth 
Amendment violation when a spike-mike placed by agents made contact with a 
heating duct in the wall of the defendant's row house because the touching constituted 
a physical intrusion into the defendant's home); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 
129, 135 (1942), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (refusing to 
fmd a Fourth Amendment violation because there was no physical invasion when 
agents used a microphone, placed into adjoining walls, to overhear defendant's 
conversations in his office); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), 
overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (finding that wiretapping was not covered by the 
Fourth Amendment because it did not involve a physical intrusion into the defendant's 
home, property, or person). 
61. Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
62. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (concluding that use of a 
thermal imaging device to detect heat radiating from a house is a "search" in part 
because "the technology in question is not in general public use"); California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209, 213-14 (1986) (holding that an expectation of privacy in 
a home's backyard is unreasonable as it can be observed from an aircraft). 
570 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REvIEW [Vol. 42 
difficult to discem.66 For example, the Supreme Court recently 
decided a case involving law enforcement's warrantless use of GPS 
tracking devices. 67 In United States v. Jones, the defendant was 
convicted of drug trafficking based in part on evidence obtained from 
a GPS tracking device FBI agents attached to his vehicle.68 The 
Court held that attaching the device to the defendant's car amounted 
to a search, triggering Fourth Amendment protections, and further, 
because the FBI agents did not have a warrant at the time the device 
was attached, the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights had been 
violated.69 Five Justices on the Court focused on the physical 
intrusion upon the defendant's property.70 
It is easy to analogize DNA to Jones. Indeed, DNA constitutes the 
very essence of an individual and it is difficult to imagine a more 
intimate physical intrusion upon one's person. Even under the pre-
Katz standard, taking a DNA sample without consent from a 
defendant would obviously constitute a search. 71 Yet states and even 
the federal government continue to pass and enforce laws mandating 
that DNA samples be taken from the arrestees of certain crimes. 72 
The argument often made is that the defendant has a subjective 
expectation of privacy concerning his genetic material, but that 
expectation is not one society is prepared to accept as reasonable. 73 
In fact, this is the very argument the government made in Jones-that 
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while 
traversing the public roads. 74 That argument failed, largely because 
66. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14. 
67. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,948 (2012). 
68. Id. at 948-49. 
69. Id. at 945-54. 
70. Id. at 949. 
71. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (concluding that drawing 
blood from the body is a "search" because it is a physical intrusion). 
72. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 296, 296.1 (West 2008); see also DNA Sample Collection 
from Arrestees, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dnai 
collection-frorn-arrestees.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). Some states, such as 
California, require that DNA samples be obtained from arrestees charged with any 
felony, while other states, such as Michigan, limit the triggering offenses to violent 
crimes and sex crimes. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 296, 296.1, invalidated by 
People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753,755 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), modified Aug. 
31, 2011, cert. granted and vacated, 292 P .3d 854 (Cal. 2011), and CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 299 (West 2012), with MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 750.520m (West 2004 & Supp. 
2012). 
73. See Williamson V. State, 413 Md. 521, 529-30 (2010) (referring to the judge's 
statement in a suppression hearing that society certainly would not accept as 
reasonable the defendant's stated expectation of privacy in his genetic material). 
74. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 950. 
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the agents in that case did not have a valid warrant when they 
installed the device on Jones's car.75 
Similarly, most of the time officers do not have a warrant to obtain 
a DNA sample from an arrestee, yet courts have continued to uphold 
laws mandating that DNA samples be taken from certain arrestees. 76 
While some argue that the police have the probable cause necessary 
to make the arrest in the first place and that should carry the day, that 
initial probable cause does not extend to the second use of the sample 
once it enters the database and the subsequent comparison to samples 
entered from cold cases.77 As discussed above, this article does not 
seek to hash out the Fourth Amendment arguments, rather it seeks to 
explore the implicit balancing test occurring in courts today: the 
comparison of the government's interest in solving cold cases versus 
the interest of arrestees in keeping their genetic profiles private. 
In Jones, the Court concluded that the government's interest in 
using GPS technology to track a known drug trafficker was not 
sufficient to permit the physical intrusion on his property-his 
vehicle-without Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 78 Following the 
Court's reasoning in Jones, it is difficult to justify allowing the 
mandatory collection of DNA samples from certain arrestees. 
Proponents of the practice claim that DNA is used-like 
fingerprints-as a means of identification. 79 That comparison is 
inaccurate and dangerous.8o Proponents further point to the ability to 
solve previously unsolvable crimes involving rape and murder. 81 But 
should the gravity of the crime in question play any role in the 
Court's constitutional analysis? It did not in Jones. Jones and his 
accomplices where charged with possession with the intent to 
75. Id. at 947,952. 
76. See Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2012), reh 'g en banc granted, 
686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that California's DNA Act requiring law 
enforcement officers to collect DNA from all adults arrested for felonies does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment). 
77. See United States v. Davis, 602 F. Supp. 2d 658, 674 (D. Md. 2009), ajJ'd, 690 F.3d 
226 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing a defense expert who explained the difference between 
cold hits and probable cause). 
78. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 947,952,954. 
79. See discussion supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
80. See discussion infra Part II.B-D. 
8!. See, e.g., Kate Alit, DNA Technology Helps Solve 38-Year-Old Cold Case, 
HEARTLAND CONNECTION (Nov. 14, 2012, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.heartlandconnection.com/news/story.aspx?id=825423#.UPtyGRlEQXc 
(chronicling the arrest of a murder suspect after evidence from the crime was re-
examined). 
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distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine after the GPS evidence 
linked him to a house where a stash consisting of $850,000 in cash, 
ninety-seven grams of cocaine, and one kilogram of cocaine base 
were discovered.82 Jones himself was sentenced to life in prison after 
his conviction.83 Although the crime Jones was convicted of was 
very serious, its gravity did not appear to play any role in the Court's 
holding that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the 
warrantless search.84 
As indicated by the disparate treatment of GPS cases like Jones and 
challenges to laws mandating the procurement of DNA samples from 
arrestees, there is an implicit balancing test occurring in COurtS. 85 The 
analogy of DNA to fingerprints is the fiction that allows this 
disparate treatment to continue.86 It appears to be driven by the belief 
that the government's interest in solving cold cases with DNA 
evidence trumps individual privacy rights. 87 This is the often 
overlooked argument this article seeks to address and dispel. 
B. The Print Edition 
"[Once] a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification 
becomes a matter of legitimate state interest.,,88 The rationale behind 
this view is the fact that the identification of suspects is "relevant not 
only to solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also 
for maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future 
crimes."S9 This same reasoning has extended from fingerprints to the 
collection of DNA upon arrest. 90 The justification for this routinely 
82. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948-49. 
83. Id. at 949. 
84. See id. at 949-956 (explaining that the court's analysis does not make mention of the 
gravity of Jones' conviction). 
85. Compare id. at 947, 949, 952 (holding that the government's interest in tracking a 
drug trafficker was not enough to justify the government's trespass on the defendant's 
vehicle to install a GPS), with Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 
2012), reh 'g en bane granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding California's 
mandatory DNA collection law). 
86. See infra Part II.B. 
87. See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652,671 (2d Cir. 2005); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 
302,306 (4th Cir. 1992). 
88. Jones, 962 F.2d at 306. 
89. Id.; see a/so Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1972 (2013); Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769, 779 (Va. 2000). 
90. See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 106-900, pt. I, at 10 (2000). The House Report justified the 
need to expedite analysis of DNA samples because a "backlog" of samples resulted in 
"killers, rapists, and other dangerous offenders who might be successfully identified 
through DNA ... to engage in further crimes against the public." Id. The Report also 
noted that (at least in theory) efficient collection and processing would ensure fewer 
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lies in the non-invasive "booking" procedures followed for most 
arrests, which already includes fingerprinting;9J thus, swiping the 
interior of the mouth with a buccal swab does not add much in terms 
of invasion and inconvenience.92 
Absent a few outliers, the majority trend in cases reviewing the 
taking of DNA samples at arrest views the activity and the 
information gathered to be analogous to fingerprinting.93 For 
example: the Second Circuit held "[t]he collection and maintenance 
of DNA information, while effected through relatively more intrusive 
procedures such as blood draws or buccal cheek swabs, in our view 
plays the same role as fingerprinting.,,94 The Third Circuit added in 
photographs for fun: "The governmental justification for [DNA] 
identification, therefore, relies on no argument different in kind from 
that traditionally advanced for taking fingerprints and photographs, 
but with additional force because of the potentially greater precision 
of DNA sampling and matching methods.,,95 The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that "the gathering of DNA information requires the 
drawing of blood rather than inking and rolling a person's fingertips 
does not elevate the intrusion upon the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment 
interests to a level beyond minimal.,,96 
State courts have followed suit,97 and while Maryland is a notable 
exception to the tired and rubber-stamped "DNA is analogous to 
wrongful convictions. Id. ("Promptly identifying the actual perpetrator of a crime 
through DNA matching exonerates any other persons who might wrongfully be 
suspected, accused, or convicted of the crime."). 
91. See, e.g., Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 671. 
92. See id. 
93. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
94. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 671. 
95. United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Jones v. 
Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992». 
96. Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995). 
97. See, e.g., State v. O'Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 280 (N.J. 2007) ("[W]e harbor no doubt 
that the taking of a buccal cheek swab is a very minor physical intrusion upon the 
person. . .. [T]hat intrusion is no more intrusive than the fingerprint procedure and 
the taking of one's photograph that a person must already undergo as part of the 
normal arrest process."); State v. Brown, 157 P.3d 301, 303 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) 
(stating, "because [using a swab to take a DNA sample from the mucous membrane of 
an arrestee's cheek] is akin to the fingerprinting of a person in custody, we conclude 
that the seizure of the defendant's DNA did not constitute an unreasonable seizure 
under the constitution"). 
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fingerprints" argument/8 most courts seem quick to merely balance 
the defendant's interest in privacy against the state's interest in 
achieving greater results in criminal investigations.99 Unfortunately, 
that conveniently traditional Fourth Amendment analysis is a 
somewhat contrived and easy mark for the courts to target. Whether 
out of brevity, myopia, or reluctance, the analysis of the privacy 
component generally fails to reach what I think is the heart of the 
matter: the information gathered. 100 
This is not to say that the question of obtaining DNA samples from 
arrestees should skip the Fourth Amendment analysis. Without a 
doubt, this is a Fourth Amendment question and requires that lens for 
proper scrutiny.IOI Indeed, most cases focus on two things: (1) the 
level of intrusion in obtaining a DNA sample; and (2) the purpose of 
obtaining that information. 102 On the question of intrusion, I 
recognize that a buccal swab on the inside of the cheek is a relatively 
minor intrusion. It is, as the Maryland Court of Appeals noted, less 
physically invasive than drawing blood. 103 Moreover, I agree with 
the dissent in King v. State that the "subcutaneous removal of blood 
from a person's veins presents only a marginal intrusion into that 
person's privacy interest, a fortiori, the insertion of a cotton swab 
into a person's mouth is less of an intrusion and fairly characterized 
as de minimis."I04 As to the purpose of the DNA collection, courts 
98. See King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 569-71, 576, 42 A.3d 549, 584-86, 595 (2012) 
(analyzing the existing case law and declining to equate DNA with fingerprints), cert 
granted sub nom. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
99. E.g., Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1196-1200 (N.D. Cal. 2009), ajJ'd sub 
nom. Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012). 
100. See infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text; infra Part II.D. Certainly, this same 
argument could be made as it pertains to obtaining DNA samples from convicted 
offenders, but given the wealth of opinions that note the reduced privacy protections 
afforded to the convicted, this paper will not discuss that issue. 
101. See King, 425 Md. at 562, 594, 42 A.3d at 556, 575 (applying Fourth Amendment 
analysis to determine whether obtaining DNA samples from arrestees is permissible). 
102. See id. at 577-79,584-85,589-92,42 A.3d at 565-66,569-70,573-75. A dissent in 
one case also focused on the presumption of innocence related to taking the DNA of 
arrestees. Mario W. v. Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389, 404 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (Norris, J., 
dissenting in part), vacated, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012). The dissenting judge 
concluded that the State failed to meet its burden to provide justification for 
abrogating the juveniles' expectation of privacy. Id. 
103. State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1, 4, 857 A.2d 19, 22 (2004); see also Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966). 
104. King, 425 Md. at 607; 42 A.3d at 583; see also United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 
387, 389, 407 (3d Cir. 2011) (Barbera, J., dissenting) (noting, in a case upholding the 
constitutionality of a federal statute that authorizes DNA collection from arrestees, 
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seem to fall into two camps. If the court determines that the primary 
purpose is identification (i.e., confirm identity or link the suspect to 
the instant crime) then it seems to pass Fourth Amendment 
analysis. 105 If, however, a court determines the purpose is 
investigation (linking the suspect to some other crime for which there 
is no probable cause), then the collection may fail the Fourth 
Amendment analysis. 106 
Of course the intrusion and purpose considerations are certainly 
necessary to the Fourth Amendment calculus,107 but they should not 
be determinative. Courts should dig deeper into the privacy prong 
and stop pretending that DNA is not any different than fingerprints. 
That analogy is merely a convenient illusion that fails to appreciate 
the wealth of information that can be gleaned from DNA samples. 
Moreover, while courts quite aptly point to the fact that the segments 
of DNA relied upon for forensic profiles are considered to be non-
coding junk,108 that argument conveniently sidesteps both the reality 
of technological advancements and the fact that many states keep the 
actual biological sample and not just the resulting profile from the 
DNA, in effect holding hostage that treasure trove of information. \09 
C. King of the Hill 
In Maryland v. King, the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that the portion of Maryland's statute authorizing the state to collect 
DNA samples from arrestees was constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment. 1 \0 The Court ultimately determined that the buccal 
cheek swab of an arrestee, like "fingerprinting and photographing," is 
"a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the 
that "the intrusion occasioned by the act of collecting the DNA sample is minimal and 
does not weigh significantly in [the arrestee's] favor"). 
105. See King, 425 Md. at 570,572-73,42 A.3d at 561-63. 
106. See id. 
107. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 
526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
108. See King, 425 Md. at 579,583,42 A.3d at 566, 569 (2011). 
109. Id. at 583, 595, 42 A.3d at 569, 576; see supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
110. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). In contrast, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals determined that law enforcement had no need for DNA to link King to the 
crime for which he was arrested. King, 425 Md. at 556, 42 A.3d at 553. 
Consequently, because fingerprints and photographs were sufficient to identify King, 
the state lacked probable cause to compel a DNA sample for this arrest. Id. 
Accordingly, the court found the statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the 
case. Id. The court noted "some trepidation as to the facial constitutionality" of the 
statute but declined to go so far as to find it facially unconstitutional. !d. 
576 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
Fourth Amendment."!!! This was a complete 180-degree departure 
from the opinion below, which took great care to summarize the 
Fourth Amendment landscape in obtaining DNA samples from 
arrestees 112 and acknowledged that it would be in the minority of 
courts by finding the collections unconstitutional. 113 Notably, the 
Maryland Count of Appeals rejected the fingerprint-DNA analogy 
that the Supreme Court majority would later wholeheartedly 
embrace.!!4 Couched in the privacy analysis, the King Court agreed 
that DNA is more than a determination of identity. 115 
Rather than finding that the DNA sample taken from arrestees 
contains "highly sensitive information coded in their genes,,,116 the 
Court labeled DNA as primarily a method of identifying arrestees.!!7 
While courts quibble over identification versus investigation, they 
touch upon some of the more significant, but often misunderstood, 
issues surrounding the collection of DNA. The misnomer "DNA 
fingerprinting"IIS contributed to the notion that the state only collects 
these samples as a means to identify. But as one court noted, "[t]he 
collection of a DNA sample ... does not 'identify' an [arrestee or 
pre-trial detainee] any more than a search of his home does-it 
merely collects more and more information about that [arrestee or 
pre-trial detainee] that can be used to investigate unsolved past or 
future crimes."119 This is an incredibly valid point, but the use of 
collected DNA samples goes beyond the Minority Report aspect of 
solving past and future crimes. 120 
Ill. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
112. King, 425 Md. at 562-65, 42 A.3d at 556-58. 
113. Id. at 573-93, 42 A.3d at 563-75. 
114. Compare King, 425 Md. at 562-65,42 A.3d at 556-58, with Maryland v. King, 133 S. 
Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
115. King, 425 Md. at 594-96, 42 A.3d at 576-77. 
116. United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387,421 (3d Cir. 2011) (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
117. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
118. Sir Alec Jeffreys is credited as the "inventor" of so-called "DNA fingerprinting." 
Giles Newton, Discovering DNA Fingerprinting, HUM. GENOME (Apr. 2, 2004), 
http://genome.wellcome.ac. uk/doc _ wtd020877 .html. 
119. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 423 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Kincade, 
379 F.3d 813, 857 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)). 
120. The Mitchell dissent also acknowledged (and the King court echoed) that the presence 
of an automatic expungement provision bolstered the conclusion that arrestees do 
have a larger privacy interest: 
If the Government's real interest were in maintaining records of 
arrestees' identities, there would be no need to expunge those 
records upon an acquittal or failure to file charges against the 
arrestee. Indeed, this statutory provision serves as an admission 
that the fact of conviction, not of mere arrest, justifies a finding 
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In effect, the fingerprint analogy is tenuous at best and fully 
inapposite at worst. Indeed, the King court culled through the various 
opinions to find the hallmarks of that platitude. The only problem is 
that many of the opinions that voice concern over the larger practice 
and collective good of obtaining DNA samples seem to be dissenting 
opinions (with a smattering of a few minority-majority opinions).121 
One judge compared the process to "the Government seiz[ing] 
personal medical information about you but ... only us[ing] the 
subset of that information that serves to identify yoU.,,122 The 
Sczubelek court observed that collecting DNA "requires production 
of evidence below the body surface which is not subject to public 
view,,,123 while the Maryland Court of Appeals in King observed that 
fingerprints are "accessible readily on the surface of the skin.,,124 
Yet another dissent noted that a "fingerprint is an impression left 
by the depositing of oil upon contact between a surface and the 
fission ridges of the fingers," while DNA "stores and reveals massive 
amounts of personal, private data about an individual." 125 It 
appears-perhaps only to allay their own concerns-that courts time 
and again accept that DNA sampling is merely part of "routine 
booking procedures.,,126 Even majority opinions that hold a tight grip 
on the fingerprint-DNA analogy acknowledge that there is more than 
meets the eye.127 For example, the Virginia Supreme Court stated 
that a DNA sample is more revealing, but ultimately concluded, as so 
many other courts have, that it "is no different in character than 
acquiring fingerprints upon arrest.,,128 
that an individual has a diminished expectation of privacy in his 
DNA. 
id.at 423 (Rendell, J., dissenting); King, 425 Md. at 581, 42 A.3d at 568. 
121. See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 416 (Rendell, J., dissenting); United States v. Sczubelek, 
402 F.3d 175, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (McKee, J., dissenting); United States v. Kincade, 
379 F.3d 813, 843 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
122. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 424. 
123. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 197-98 (McKee, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Mills, 686 
F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1982». 
124. King, 425 Md. at 582, 42 A.3d at 568. (citing Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 424-25 (Rendell, 
J., dissenting». 
125. Mario W. v. Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389, 407 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (Norris, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 221; Kincade, 379 F.3d at 842 n.3 (Gould, J., 
concurring» (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012). 
126. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013); Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 413; 
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702,705 (Va. 2007). 
127. See generally Anderson, 653 S .E.2d at 705. 
128. Id. 
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Mirroring that conclusion, the King Court openly embraced the 
analogy between fingerprints and DNA samples. 129 The dissent, 
however, vigorously rejects this analogy by highlighting the major 
distinctions between fingerprint and DNA analysis. 130 It does (and 
should) matter that a "person's entire genetic makeup and history is 
forcibly seized and maintained in a government file, subject only to 
the law's direction that it not be improperly used.,,131 To put it 
bluntly, what lies beneath matters. 
D. A Hunk of Junk 
The majority in King embraces the fingerprint-DNA analogy 
propagated by other courts. 132 Courts often note that only non-
identifying "junk DNA" is used in the analysis and development of 
forensic profiles. 133 It is true that the thirteen loci were chosen "in 
response to congressional concern over privacy protections, because 
they are considered 'non-coding' [segments of] DNA" and do not 
reveal any diagnostic, characteristic, or other "private information.,,134 
The resulting DNA profile used in databases is absent of any 
identifying information, including fingerprints, criminal history, or 
129. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). The Court goes so far as to describe 
DNA identification as "an advanced technique superior to fingerprinting in many 
ways," noting that "DNA is a markedly more accurate form of identifying arrestees." 
Id. at 1976 ("A suspect who has changed his facial features to evade photographic 
identification or even one who has undertaken the more arduous task of altering his 
fingerprints cannot escape the revealing power of his DNA."). 
130. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1987 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia 
notes three major distinctions between DNA and fingerprints: (I) DNA analysis takes 
months to complete in comparison to the mere half hour needed to analyze 
fingerprints; (2) DNA databases contain no personal identifying information, whereas 
fingerprint databases contain detailed identification information; and (3) DNA 
samples are compared against crime scene evidence to help solve crimes, while 
fingerprints are not compared against the database of known prints. Id. The 
Maryland Court of Appeals in King seemed persuaded that DNA "remains distinct 
from a fingerprint" since "[t]he information derived from a fingerprint is related only 
to physical characteristics," while a DNA sample "contains within it unarguably much 
more than a person's identity." See King, 425 Md. at 596-96, 42 A.3d at 576-77. 
And while the Maryland DNA Collection Act "restricts the DNA profile to identifying 
information only"-as do similar laws in other states-the Maryland Court of Appeals 
in King is right to "not tum a blind eye to the vast genetic treasure map that remains in 
the DNA sample retained by the State." Id. at 586,42 A.3d at 577. 
131. King, 425 Md. at 596, 42 A.3d at 577 (quoting State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1,50,857 
A.2d 19,48-49 (2004) (Wilner, J., concurring». 
132. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
133. King, 425 Md. at 567-68 & n.17, 42 A.3d at 560 & n.l7 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
134. Id. at 567--68, 42 A.3d at 560. 
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photographs. 135 And while this seems to sanitize the process, making 
it more palatable, that biological sample generally remains in the 
custody of the state because further analysis will be needed when and 
if there is a match. 136 
While we may be able to sleep better at night telling ourselves that 
it is just "junk," that assumption may be eroding quickly.137 Despite 
being colloquially labeled "junk," geneticists continue to argue that 
even non-coding junk DNA is active and useful. 138 Technology does 
not wait for the legal system to catch up with it. From DNA to GPS, 
"the boon that new technology will provide to law enforcement, is an 
engraved invitation to future expansion.,,139 As for junk DNA, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals in King left us with the ominous 
statement that there is "considerable current debate as to whether 
these 'non-coding' or 'junk' DNA provide no predictive genetic 
information. ,,140 
This is not merely conjecture of things to come. Recently, by 
virtue of a federally funded project (there is some irony to that), 
scientists discovered that our genetic material 
is packed with at least four million gene switches that reside 
in bits of DNA that once were dismissed as 'junk" but that 
tum out to play critical roles in controlling how cells, organs 
and other tissues behave. 141 
This advancement has "enormous implications" on both the 
medical and criminal justice fronts. 142 If the "junk" DNA controls 
our genes, then it provides an "annotated road map" and now reveals 
far more than the innocuous short tandem repeats (STRs) we thought 
135. Id. at 568, 42 A.3d at 560. 
136. See id. 
137. Id. at 568 n.17, 42 A.3d at 560 n.17. 
138. Brief of Genetics, Genomics and Forensic Science Researchers as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party at 25-26, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-
207). 
139. Mario W. v. Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389, 410 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (Norris, J., dissenting) 
(quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, 1., 
dissenting)), vacated, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012). 
140. King, 425 Md. at 568 n.17, 42 A.3d at 560 n.17 (citing Simon A. Cole, Is the "Junk" 
DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 54, 54 (2007), available at 
http://www.law.northwestem.edullawreview/colloquy/2007123/, in support of the 
continued scholarly debate on the matter of "junk" DNA). 
141. Gina Kolata, Study Discovers Road Map o/DNA: A Key to Biology, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
6,2012, at AI. 
142. Id.; see also Cole, supra note 140, at 54-56. 
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we were using. 143 One researcher labeled it as a "Google Maps" that 
can be a "stunning resource."I44 
While this is truly a breakthrough, other research has hinted at the 
importance of junk DNA. 14S British scientists noted in a study a few 
years ago that "the standard DNA profile contains a subtle signature 
which can be linked to a person's susceptibility to Type 1 
diabetes.,,146 Alec Jeffreys, the godfather of DNA fingerprinting, 147 
and part of the British research team, noted that "further troubling 
links between DNA fingerprints and disease will emerge as scientists 
probe the completed draft of the human genome.,,148 If it is true that 
"[h]uman DNA is 'a lot more active than we expected, and there are a 
lot more things happening than we expected,,,,149 then perhaps we 
should reconsider using the "junk" feature of select DNA as an 
argument in support of the continued expansion of DNA databases. 
Even with these advances, courts seem reticent to consider the 
possibility that the DNA profiles currently warehoused in databases 
around the country contain more infonnation than we bargained 
for. ISO After all, proponents of databases sold us a bill of goods that 
included the assurance these database profiles "need be no more 
infonnative than an ordinary fingerprint."lsl Courts have repeatedly 
relied on the representations that the "molecular sequences at DNA 
loci ... are not indicative of an individual's personal traits or 
143. Kolata, supra note 141, at A3. The length variations of STRs ultimately detennine 
the significance of the genetic infonnation conveyed. Brief of Genetics, Genomics 
and Forensic Science Researchers as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 29-
30, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207) ("One must ask whether 
the length variations of the particular STRs actually convey meaningful information, 
and they seem to contain less trait-related infonnation than a photograph of an 
arrestee."). 
144. Id. (quoting Dr. Eric Lander). 
145. Id. at AI; see also Sumitra Pithawala et aI., Junk DNA: An Evolutionary Trash or 
Nature's Best Bequest?, 5 LV.P. J. GENETICS & EVOLUTION 55, 55-56, 59-63 (2012). 
146. Candice Roman-Santos, Concerns Associated with Expanding DNA Databases, 2 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH L.J. 267, 291-92 (2010). 
147. See supra note 118. 
148. Roman-Santos, supra note 146, at 291-92. 
149. Kolata, supra note 141, at A3 (quoting Ewan Birney). 
150. See King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 570-71, 42 A.3d 549, 561, cert. granted sub nom. 
Maryland v. King 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012); Roman-Santos, supra note 146, at 284-85. 
151. Sei! King, 425 Md. at 609, 42 A.3d at 585 (Barbera, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. 
Raines, 383 Md. 1,45,857 A.2d 19,45-47 (2004) (Raker, J., concurring». 
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propensities.,,152 But the profile is not "like a social security 
number ... assigned by chance, not by the federal government.,,153 
It would be more honest to say that we simply do not know 
whether the procedures by which DNA samples are tested will 
inevitably "disclose intimate genetic information.,,154 Given the 
progression of science and the new territories of the human genome 
we continue to uncover, those loci may ultimately reveal certain 
genetic traits or predispositions. ISS Even without probing into the 
function of junk DNA, we have begun to data mine existing 
databases to search for racial commonalities and frequencies within 
the confines of the thirteen CODIS 10ci.156 Consequently, as science 
progresses, so, too, should our understanding of what exactly it is we 
are taking when we extract DNA from arrestees. DNA is not a 
fingerprint. It never has been, and it never will be.157 
III. DNA Policy in Maryland: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 
According to the Maryland Governor's Office of Crime Control 
and Prevention website, there are currently 106,721 CODIS samples 
in Maryland's database. 158 Of those, 1,514 samples were added 
during the first five months of 2013. 159 To date, there have been 
2,880 hits resulting from the Maryland CODIS databank. 160 
Notwithstanding the Maryland Court of Appeal's decision in King, 
Maryland was able to obtain a stay of the impact of the case, and it 
continues to collect and include arrestee samples in its CODIS 
database. 161 Since Maryland began collecting DNA from arrestees in 
152. Id. 
153. Raines, 383 Md. at 45,857 A.2d at 45-46 (quoting D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, 
DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-
Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REv. 413,431(2003)). 
154. King, 425 Md. at 608, 42 A.3d at 584. 
155. See Roman-Santos, supra note 146, at 292 (quoting Sir Alex Jeffreys). 
156. See, e.g., Bruce Budowle et a\., Population Data on the Thirteen CODIS Core Short 
Tandem Repeat Loci in African Americans, u.s. Caucasians, Hispanics, Bahamians, 
Jamaicans, and Trinidadians, 44 FORENSIC SCI. 1277, 1277 (1999), available at 
Iibrary-resources.cqu.edu.aulJFSIPDF /vol_ 44/iss _ 6/ JFS44634.pdf. 
157. My quibble with the fingerprint-DNA analogy should not be confused with, nor does 
it touch upon, the issues surrounding the actual analysis and interpretation of DNA 
evidence. The problems with that analysis and interpretation are better raised in a 
separate article. 
158. DNA Statistics, GOVERNOR'S OFF. CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/dna/statistics.php (last updated May 28,2013). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1,3 (2012); see also DNA Statistics, supra note 158. 
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2009, there have been 245 charged offender hits that resulted in 
seventy-nine arrests. 162 Yet, with the specter of King lurking, 
Maryland has contemplated some significant changes to its DNA 
database laws. 163 
A. The Good? Changes in Maryland's DNA Database Provisions 
At first blush, Maryland's DNA database provisions seem to be 
very protective of privacy (if you set aside the fact that its policy is to 
collect DNA from a wide array of offenders).I64 Section 2-
504(a)(3)(ii) currently provides for notice to individuals charged with 
a violent crime or burglary that their records may be expunged in 
accordance with section 2_511. 165 In pertinent part, section 2-511(a) 
provides: 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, 
any DNA samples and records generated as part of a 
criminal investigation or prosecution shall be destroyed or 
expunged automatically from the State DNA data base166 if: 
(i) a criminal action begun against the individual 
relating to the crime does not result in a conviction 
of the individual [ .] 167 
Section 2-511 further provides that the DNA record must be 
expunged from any database that it was uploaded to, including local, 
state and federal databases. 168 Thus, Maryland appears to be on the 
forefront of putting the onus on the State to destroy the sample and 
expunge the DNA profiles of persons who are ultimately not 
convicted. 169 This is in sharp contrast to the vast majority of other 
162. DNA Statistics, supra note 158. 
163. Compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2011) with revised § 2-
504 (effective Jan. 1,2014). 
164. Issue Papers: 2013 Legislative Session, MD. DEP'T LEGIS. SERVS., 180 (2012); 
Maryland DNA Legislation, GOVERNOR'S OFF. CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/dnallegislation.php (last updated Jan. 12,2011). 
165. PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3)(ii). 
166. There are, however, local DNA databanks, and many automatic expungement 
provisions do not extend to those DNA databanks. Jessica D. Gabel and Stephen 
Mercer, Shadow Dwellers: The Under-regulated World of Local DNA Databanks, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2014). 
167. Id. § 2-511(a)(I)(i) (emphasis added). 
168. Id. § 2-511(c) ("Any DNA record expunged in accordance with this section shall be 
expunged from every data base into which it has been entered, including local, State, 
and federal data bases."). 
169. Julie Samuels et aI., Collecting DNA from Arrestees: Implementation Lessons. NAT'L 
INST. JUST. 1. June 2012, at 18,23. 
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states that have some sort of purge mechanism, but require a formal 
request that the profile be expunged from the system. 170 
A closer look at the legislative history surrounding the Maryland 
statute, however, gives us a glimpse of what could have been. 
Section 2-511 (and other provisions of the Maryland DNA database 
law) originally had a sunset date of December 31, 2013.171 If that 
sunset provision had not been repealed, the automatic purge 
obligation that I applauded would have disappeared. 172 Starting on 
January 1,2014: 
An individual whose DNA record or profile is included in 
the statewide DNA data base system and whose DNA 
sample is stored in the statewide DNA repository may 
request that information be expunged on the grounds that 
the conviction that resulted in the inclusion meets the 
expungement criteria specified in § 10-105 or § 10-106 of 
the Criminal Procedure Article. 173 
Under this new provision, the state would no longer have had an 
obligation to either destroy the sample or expunge the resulting DNA 
profile from the database. 174 Moreover, the scope of the purge would 
have only applied to the state database and not any other database to 
which the "DNA record, DNA sample, or other identifiable 
information" may have been added. 175 By ultimately rejecting these 
proposed changes, Maryland remains a more defense friendly pioneer 
by keeping both the automatic expungement requirement and 
preventing the sample, profile and other identifiable information 
from lingering in other databases. 176 Had these proposed changes 
come to fruition it might have been the appropriate time to say 
"shame on Maryland," but it would only have been following the lead 
of its sister states. 
170. Jd.; e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:614(A) (2012) (permitting "a person whose DNA 
record or profile has been included in the data base or data bank" to "request that his 
record or profile be removed"). 
17l. Act of May 13,2008, § 4, 2008 Md. Laws 337. 
172. Compare PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(a), with § 2-511(a) (LexisNexis 2003). 
173. § 2-511 (LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added). 
174. Compare § 2-511(a), with § 2-511(a) (LexisNexis 2003) 
175. § 2-511(c) (LexisNexis 2003). 
176. Compare § 2-511, with § 2-511 (LexisNexis 2003). 
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B. The Bad: Family Matters 
Maryland also seemed poised to be on the forefront of ethical 
considerations with its wholesale prohibition on familial DNA 
searches. Section 2-506( d) specifically prohibits the "search of the 
statewide DNA data base for the purpose of identification of an 
offender in connection with a crime for which the offender may be a 
biological relative of the individual from whom the DNA sample" 
was taken. 177 Familial searching is a database process by which 
investigators move past looking for a perfect match between samples 
and instead seek out partial matches between crime scene DNA 
profiles and the offender/arrestee DNA index. 178 By looking for the 
imperfect match, the search may identify in the database a relative of 
the target suspect (sometimes referred to as the "pivot"), who is not 
in the index. 179 An interview with the pivot may then provide enough 
information to ultimately lead investigators to the target. 180 
While some states-Califomial81 and Colorado l82-have active 
familial search policies in place, Maryland specifically declined to 
participate in the practice. 183 In a previous article, I speculated that 
the reason for Maryland's ban on familial searches was more likely 
177. § 2-506. For a discussion of Maryland's no familial search policy, see generally 
Gabel, supra note 28, at 22. Section 2-506 only references the statewide DNA data 
base, leaving no "restrictions on the ways local police can use their own DNA 
databases." Ian Duncan, A Push for DNA Collection Changes, BALT. SUN, Mar. 2, 
2013, at 2A. Although section 2-506(d) proclaims to prohibit familial searching, the 
"statute leaves open one common alternative approach, which is to allow reporting of 
inadvertent partial matches." Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 37, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (No. 12-
207),2013 WL 476046. 
178. Familial Searching, FBI, http://www.tbi.gov/about-usllablbiometric-analysis/codis/ 
familial-searching (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). New developments in DNA technology 
and techniques, like familial searching, "have been implemented without express 
legislative permission or judicial oversight." Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic 
Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 40, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 
I (2012) (No. 12-207),2013 WL 476046. 
179. Erica Haimes, Social and Ethical Issues in the Use of Familial Searching in Forensic 
Investigations: Insights from Family and Kinship Studies, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 263, 
269 (2006). 
180. Jd. at 263. 
181. CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DIV. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, INFORMATION BULLETIN: DNA 
PARTIAL MATCH (CRIME SCENE DNA PROFILE TO OFFENDER) POLICY, (Apr. 25, 2008), 
available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms _ attachments/press/pdfs/n 1548_ 08-bfs-0 I.pdf. 
182. COLO. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DNA FAMILIAL RESEARCH POLICY, (Oct. 22,2009), 
available at http://www.denverda.orgIDNA_DocumentslPolicies/ 
CO%20fs%20policy.pdf. 
183. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (LexisNexis 2011). 
2013] Indecent Exposure 585 
the product of "political pressure than constitutional misgivings or 
scientific uncertainty.,,184 I predicted-despite ethical misgivings-
that familial searching practices were unavoidable "crime fighting 
tools of the future ... here to stay in some form or another.,,185 It 
seems that Maryland seriously considered surrendering to the 
addictive lure of familial DNA searches. 
The proposed new section 2-506 apparently lost subsection (d), 
which prohibited familial searching. 186 It does not take a quixotic 
leap to see that the absence of the exclusion would permit the practice 
by virtue of its silence on the subject. 187 It would also mean that 
Maryland would be able to perform familial searches without the 
restrictions that other states have put in place. 188 For example, 
California requires a certain number of alleles in common before any 
additional investigation can be done. 189 Removing the familial search 
limitation would have enabled Maryland to run unbridled database 
trawls, but Maryland lawmakers ultimately rejected this proposed 
change by removing the statute's sunset provision. 190 The ability to 
hunt for relatives raises serious concerns about the privacy of and 
protections afforded to individuals who are not suspects but who may 
be related to someone in the database. 191 
Familial searches, however, represent yet another extension of the 
initial purpose of DNA databases. At a minimum, if Maryland plans 
to conduct familial searches in its database, it should have specific 
provisions regarding how such searches are to be conducted. 
Moreover, there are larger considerations at issue such as the fact that 
databases "were meant to identify the perpetrator who left the 
184. Gabel, supra note 28, at 43. 
185. ld. 
186. Compare PUB. SAFETY § 2-506, with revised § 2-506. (effective Jan. 1,2014). 
187. See § 2-506 (effective Jan. 1,2014). 
188. Compare § 2-506 (effective Jan. 1, 2014) (abrogating Maryland's restriction of 
familial DNA searches), with DNA PARTIAL MATCH POLICY, supra note 181 
(California's familial DNA search policy), and DNA FAMILIAL RESEARCH POLICY, 
supra note 182 (Colorado's familial DNA search policy). 
189. DNA PARTIAL MATCH POLICY, supra note 181 ("When a partial match occurs that has 
at least 15 shared STR alleles with an offender, DOJ will contact the local 
laboratory's CODIS administrator to confirm that the case is not yet solved. If the 
case is still active, the case investigator should be notified of the partial match by the 
local CODIS laboratory and the process defined in the policy will be followed upon 
request."). 
190. See PUB. SAFETY § 2-506 (effective Jan. 1,2014); 2013 Md. Laws 431. 
191. Haimes, supra note 179, at 269-71. 
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sample, not the family members of the perpetrator.,,192 We cannot 
ignore that genomic research demonstrates that humans are "99.9 
percent identical at the DNA level, irrespective of gender, race or 
ethnicity.,,\93 Given that, at a molecular level we will only find more 
genetic links and more commonalities rather than the differences that 
DNA databases are supposedly built upon. 194 If employed in a 
haphazard approach, familial searches may ultimately ensnare 
innocent people and hamper criminal investigations. 
C. The Ugly: Research without Borders 
Some of the rather bombastic reasoning telling us that DNA 
databases are safe, effective, and present no intrusion into the lives of 
the average person is false. 195 After all, so the false logic goes, only 
criminals (or criminals-in-the-making) are caught within the snares of 
the database. 196 The proliferation of databases, however, is not 
limited to use in criminal investigations. 197 Genetic data is also 
compiled and maintained for medical research. 198 In fact, Maryland 
mingles the two. The Maryland public safety code sanctions the use 
of DNA information for "research" and maintenance of a "population 
data base.,,199 In addition to the crime-related provisions, the statute 
192. Gabel, supra note 28, at 49 (emphasis omitted). With DNA warehoused in databanks 
with little to no judicial involvement, law enforcement officers "use genetic material 
to draw conclusions about the DNA profiles of offenders' relatives." Brief of 14 
Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 36, 
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (No. 12-207),2013 WL 476046. 
193. Michael Hadjiargyrou, Letter to the Editor, Our Shared DNA, N.Y. TiMES, June 23, 
2012, at A18. The author, a molecular biologist, opined that "we are all brothers and 
sisters ... the more we look into our genealogy." Id. 
194. See id. 
195. Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California's Proposition 69: A Dangerous 
Precedentfor Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279,283-84 (2005). 
196. See Samuels et aI., supra note 169, at 19. Some forensic evidence professors suggest 
that procuring DNA samples from arrestees is not necessary to "exonerate the 
innocent," because often the true perpetrator would be listed in a convicted offender 
DNA database, thus removing the need for arrestee DNA samples. Brief of 14 
Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 21-23, 
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (No. 12-207),2013 WL 476046. 
197. Mary McCarthy, Am I My Brother's Keeper?: Familial DNA Searches in the Twenty-
First Century, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 381, 410 (2011). 
198. E.g., Yael Bregman-Eschet, Genetic Databases and Biobanks: Who Controls Our 
Genetic PrivaCy, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 1,2 (2006-2007). 
199. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 2-505(a)(5)(i), 2-509(b) (LexisNexis 2011). 
Moreover, there is concern that crime victim data may also be included in the 
population data base. See § 2-501 (i)(3) (providing that a DNA sample encompasses 
"body fluid or tissue" that is "submitted to the statewide data base system for testing 
as part of a criminal investigation"). Crime victims then run the risk of being twice 
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also permits the state to utilize genetic samples "for research and 
administrative purposes.,,200 The illustrative research-related uses 
include "development of a population data base after personal 
identifying information is removed.,,201 The provisions addressing 
the population database also mandate removal of all personal 
information prior to entering the data. 202 There is mounting evidence, 
however, that simply deleting identifying information is insufficient 
to protect privacy. 203 
In a widely-reported study, investigators were able to identify both 
individual donors and their families from "anonymous" genetic 
data.204 Alarmingly, the authors found "that data release, even of a 
few markers, from one person can spread through deep genealogical 
ties.,,205 Even a small data-leak could ultimately identify people who 
lacked any social ties to the donor.206 Although perhaps the most 
disconcerting, this study is not the first to demonstrate the 
vulnerability of genetic information.207 These findings suggest that 
maintaining the anonymity of genetic information may be impossible. 
Moreover, the authors speculate that privacy breaches will become 
both easier and more common.208 
As a consequence of the extracurricular activities sponsored by 
Maryland's DNA law/09 Maryland seems to be following other states 
and the federal govemment down the path of "mission creep.,,2iO The 
difficulties in protecting private individuals' information raise a 
number of vexing problems. Individuals with particular gene 
victimized. First, in the initial incident, and again should their information be 
compromised. 
200. See id. § 2-505(a)(5). 
201. Id. § 2-505(a)(5)(i). 
202. Id. § 2-509(b). 
203. See Veronique Lacapra, Anonymity in Genetic Research Can Be Fleeting, NPR (Jan. 
17, 2013, 3:47 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/healthl2013/01l17/169609144/ 
anonymity-in-genetic-research-can-be-fleeting. 
204. Melissa Gymrek et aI., IdentifYing Personal Genomes by Surname Inference, 339 SCI. 
321,324 (2013); Lacapra, supra note 203. 
205. Gymrek et aI., supra note 204, at 324. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 321. The researchers here did not repeat the exact method used, but they noted 
that the resources were all publicly available. 
208. Lacapra, supra note 203. 
209. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(a) (LexisNexis 2011). 
210. See David Schultz, It's Legal for Some Insurers to Discriminate Based on Genes, 
NPR (Jan. 17, 2013, 6:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/healthl2013/011l7/ 
169634045/some-types-of-insurance-can-discriminate-based-on-genes. 
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sequences may face discrimination.2lI This type of discrimination 
could occur in a number of forms. For example, companies may 
refuse to issue life insurance, disability insurance, or long-term care 
policies to individuals based upon particular genes.212 Yet research 
suggests that genetic variations noted in DNA databases are not likely 
to help diagnose or predict diseases.213 In addition to insurance risks, 
there is the grave danger of misuse of this information to wrongfully 
and indelibly stigmatize individuals as criminals. Imagine a 
Huxleyan nightmare in which science is purportedly able to 
determine the propensity for crime or violence through certain 
genetic markers. Forget judge and jury, instead pseudoscience will 
determine the fate of individuals-possibly for the duration of their 
lives. Given the near-religious embrace of DNA, this is not a far-
fetched concern.214 
IV. ALL DNA IS IDENTIFYING, BUT NOT ALL 
IDENTIFICATION IS AS HARMLESS AS 
FINGERPRINTING: CAUTION FOR THE FUTURE 
Before we started expanding the use of DNA databases, we should 
have considered three things: (1) would expansion increase 
investigative outcomes; (2) are those outcomes worth the 
consequences; and (3) is the advancement of DNA technology fixed? 
21l. See id. 
212. !d. There is a federallaw prohibiting health insurance companies from discriminating 
based on genetic data. Genetic Infonnation Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-233, sec. 101(a), § 1182(b), 122 Stat. 881, 883 (2008)). The provision is 
limited solely to health insurance. See id. 
213. Brief of Genetics, Genomics and Forensic Science Researchers as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party at 20-21, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-
207) ("[C]o-inheritance of a marker and genetic disease tells researchers that a gene 
mutation causing the disease lies near the STR marker. But the STR marker in no way 
'causes' the disease."). Currently, no published research supports the use of database 
records of genetic variations as a means of disease diagnosis or prediction, because 
there is no beneficial link between CODIS alleles and genetic traits. ld. at 23-25. 
214. WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, THE POTENTIAL FOR ERROR IN FORENSIC DNA TESTING (AND 
How THAT COMPLICATES THE USE OF DNA DATABASES FOR CRIMINAL 
IDENTIFICATION) 2 (2008) available at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/ 
pageDocumentsIH4T5EOYUZl.pdf Indeed, there is recent and on-going precedent 
for such a practice. The so-called "psychopath test" is often dispositive as to matters 
of parole and influential as to sentencing. Alix Spiegel, Can a Test Really Tell Who's 
a Psychopath?, NPR (May 26, 2011, 2:24 PM), http://www.npr.org/ 
2011l05/261136619689/can-a-test-really-tell-whos-a-psychopatho The test has even 
influenced whether the death penalty is administered. ld. This use of the test remains 
pervasive-even though the test's creator has expressed concern over the practice. Ira 
Glass, The Psychopath Test, CHI. PUB. MEDIA (May 27,2011) (interviewing the test's 
creator Bob Hare). 
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While the first may have been a no-brainer, it seems that we have not 
given any real thought to the other two. It seems likely that with the 
Supreme Court's decision this year, DNA databases and the 
populations housed within them will continue to explode in 
numbers.215 As citizens, DNA and the concept of turning it over 
freely has become as routine as giving private information over to the 
likes of Facebook, LinkedIn, and other social media outlets?16 We 
are indifferent to the number of situations that call for the submission 
of genetic material to medical providers, businesses selling at-home 
genetic tests, ancestry websites, and other public and private 
institutions. The reality is that troves of our genetic data are 
"persistent and widely shared" and incredibly difficult for us later to 
"access, to verify, or to correct.,,217 
It should not surprise us, then, that the criminal justice system 
wants to collect DNA from an ever-increasing spectrum of people 
who come into contact with it.218 The notion of privacy and the 
presumption of innocence are now blurred figures in this landscape. 
These concerns do not pertain to simply the collection of DNA 
profiles and samples, but also to the other information that may be 
kept. 219 While criminal investigations and medical research 
previously operated in different genetic spheres, those spheres are 
starting to converge. When DNA is collected on arrest and uploaded 
into the database, it is not simply translated into an identity-free 
criminal bar code.220 Ultimately, that digitized profile must link to a 
name, to a location, and possibly to a criminal record. 221 Other 
records may also be available, especially for released offenders 
because police must be able to track that person down if there is a hit 
in the database later.222 Ultimately, we may find that when police do 
215. United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2005) (McKee, 1., 
dissenting). 
216. Cj United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 848-49 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting). 
217. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-366, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1988). 
218. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 872-73. 
219. See, e.g., 1. Clay Smith, Jr., The Precarious Implications of DNA Profiling, 55 U. 
Pm. L. REv. 865, 886-87 (1994). 
220. See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the 
Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 721, 752 (2007). 
221. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 819-20, 838 (Reinhardt, 1., dissenting). 
222. Id. 
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contact a database offender they may also be able to tell that person 
his or her predisposition to kidney disease. 223 
In the wake of the King case, the fingerprint-DNA analogy has 
overstayed its welcome. Nonetheless, it seems that it is not slated for 
retirement any time soon despite enduring concerns about the 
expansion of DNA collection.224 If the extension of DNA databases 
is in fact inevitable, then it should likewise be foreseeable that DNA 
technology may advance and outpace the restrictions once thought 
sufficient to keep databases sufficiently void of identifying 
information. As for now, it seems we would rather be content to 
operate databases at the margins of technology and tolerate a certain 
margin of error when things go awry. 225 The criminal.iustice system 
hungers for the ability to solve crime and convict the guilty. 
Databases certainly feed that insatiable beast, but we need to respect 
that DNA is not the tame dormouse we once thought it to be. 
223. Id. at 850. 
224. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's 
judgment will, to be sure, have the beneficial effect of solving more crimes; then 
again, so would the taking of DNA samples from anyone who flies on an 
airplane ... [b Jut I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties 
would have been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection."). 
225. D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on A"est, 10 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL'y 455, 507 (2001). 
